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Abstract:
Using a sample of China’s listed firms between 2003 and 2014, this study finds that
firms receive more bank loans after the stimulus package which is less significant for firms
with conservative accounting. In addition, firms with conservative accounting exhibit higher
investment efficiency, which becomes weaker after the stimulus package which represents an
exogenous shock to credit supply. Further analysis shows that the abovementioned findings
are more significant for non-SOEs, firms from less government-favoured industries and
regions, and firms with severe interest conflicts between debtholders and shareholders. These
results are robust for alternative specification and alternative measurements. Overall, these
findings suggest that the beneficial effects of accounting conservatism are subject to
institutional environments and government policies.
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1. Introduction
The 2007-2008 global financial crisis reduced the liquidity of the banking sector,
resulting in banking panic and the deterioration of investment environments, and thus
reducing banks’ incentives to lend and firms’ incentives to invest (Ivashina and Scharfstein,
2010; Duchin et al., 2010). Recent studies document that conservative accounting can
effectively ameliorate the negative consequences of the financial crisis and improve a firm’s
value (Francis et al., 2013; Balakrishnan et al., 2015). The benefits of accounting
conservatism derive from the fact that it enforces the timely recognition of economic losses
and provides informational advantages, such as reducing information asymmetry (Watts,
2003; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008), mitigating agency problems (Ahmend et al., 2002;
Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Garcia Lara et al., 2016) and lowering cost of capital (Zhang,
2008; Haw et al., 2014). These benefits are attributed to the monitoring role of accounting
conservatism over self-dealing behaviours of shareholders and managers. This effective
monitoring in turn improves firms’ decision of capital allocation (Bushman and Smith, 2001;
Ahmed and Duellman, 2011).
However, does this economic implication of conservative accounting still hold if the
liquidity of the banking sector and investment environments are not adversely affected by the
financial crisis? Specifically, in response to financial crisis, many countries have launched
economic stimulus packages, aiming to restore economic growth. Some of them are
implemented through increasing bank loan supply and encouraging firms to invest, such as
the scenario in China. While a basic notion of how firms with conservative accounting
respond to financial crisis is expected to hold in the US market that experiences capital
freezing, it is unclear what happens to this mitigating role of accounting conservatism in
economies that experience a credit expansion.
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of accounting conservatism on
bank lending incentives and firm investment efficiency in the context of China. This study is
also aimed at examining this influence after the implementation of the stimulus package,
which received broad attention from the media. These issues are important because bank loan
supply and firm investment efficiency are key determinants of economic recovery and growth
after the stimulus package. Examining these issues can gauge the financial implications of the
accounting conservatism during the post-stimulus package period and advance our
understanding of the beneficial effects of conservative accounting to both lenders and
borrowers.
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In addition to the fact that China has experienced a credit expansion period following the
implementation of the stimulus package, other important features to note when focusing on
China are that most banks are controlled by the governments and most firms are bankdependent. These features of Chinese economy are well-suited for this study for several
reasons. First, unlike the US market that has both private and public debt markets, the bond
market in China is underdeveloped and bank loans are the main form of external finance, thus
firms are more bank-dependent and their financing ability is more sensitive to exogenous
shock of bank loan supply resulting from the stimulus package. This facilitates the
examination of how accounting conservatism affects banks’ lending incentives. Second, the
prior documented beneficial effect of accounting conservatism on firm investment decisions
holds in developed markets with strong legal enforcement (Ahmed and Duellman, 2011;
Garcia Lara et al., 2016), and it is argued that the adoption of accounting conservatism and
better investment decisions are both driven by a developed institutional environment.
Nevertheless, the Chinese economy features an underdeveloped legal system and weak law
enforcement, which facilitates this analysis to draw the meaningful inference of the
accounting conservatism influence on firm investment efficiency. Third, the Chinese
economy is under the control of the government with a fast growing private economy. Prior
evidence suggests that government involvement in business discourages the adoption of
conservative accounting (Bushman et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2010). In this sense, the
variations of ownership structure in China provide a further robust setting to examine the role
of accounting conservatism in the presence of government ownership. Fourth, in response to
the global financial crisis, China launched the largest economic stimulus package at the end
of 2008, which has contributed significantly to the recovery of the world’s economy. This
also provides a natural experiment to investigate the influence of accounting conservatism on
bank lending incentives and firm investment efficiency. In addition, China is the largest
emerging market which shares some common characteristics with other emerging markets, so
the evidence from China can be generalized to other emerging markets.
To examine this issue, this study uses a difference-in-differences (DID) approach for
estimation to compare the bank lending and firm investment efficiency before and after the
implementation of the stimulus package as a function of firm accounting conservatism.
However, a potential issue arises when firm accounting conservatism changes after the
implementation of the stimulus package or is related to firm unobserved characteristics, so
that firm accounting conservatism could be endogenously determined. To address this
endogeneity issue, the specification is designed that firm accounting conservatism is
3

measured one quarter prior to the implementation of the stimulus package, which is
consistent with Duchin et al. (2010) and Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013).
Using a large sample of quarterly data of all Chinese listed firms between 2003 and 2014, this
study documents the following findings. First, after the implementation of the stimulus
package, firms experience a larger increase in bank borrowing which is less significant for
firms with conservative accounting. Second, firms with conservative accounting invest more
efficiently which is less significant after the implementation of the stimulus package. Third,
the above findings are more significant for non-SOEs (non-state owned enterprises), firms
from less government favoured industries and regions, and firms with more severe interest
conflicts between debtholders and shareholders/managers. The general results are robust for
alternative specification and alternative measurements.
This study contributes existing literature in the following ways. First, existing studies
document that accounting conservatism benefits borrowers in terms of lower financing costs
(Zhang, 2008). This study complements this by documenting that firms with conservative
accounting have access to more bank loans. In addition, prior literature argues that
accounting conservatism is a corporate governance mechanism that decreases firm incentives
to make negative NPV (net present value) investments and avoids riskier projects (Watts,
2003; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Ahmed and Duellman, 2011). Therefore, accounting
conservatism can improve firm investment efficiency (Garcia Lara et al., 2016). This paper
presents evidence of how accounting conservatism affects firm investment efficiency in an
emerging market and thus, contributes additional evidence to the existing body of literature.
Moreover, by focusing on the interest conflicts between debtholders and shareholders, this
paper also examines the change of conservatism-investment efficiency relationship in
response to the expansion of external finance.
More importantly, the beneficial effects of accounting conservatism have been
documented to be more significant when firms experience capital contraction following the
onset of financial crisis (Francis et al., 2013; Balakrishnan et al., 2015). The results of this
study complement this line of research and document that beneficial effects of accounting
conservatism are mitigated when firms experience capital expansion resulting from the
stimulus package in response to financial crisis.
Second, Bushman et al. (2011) employ cross-country analysis and find that conservatism
is associated with efficient investment. However, cross-country analysis could raise a few
concerns. Specifically, there is a large variation of institutional environments across countries,
including legal systems, taxation regimes, political economies and security laws. The
4

observed variations of accounting conservatism and investment efficiency are likely to be the
results of these institutional factors at the country level (Ball et al., 2008). Firms domiciled in
the same country comply with similar accounting standards and regulations, and thus it is
unclear whether conservative accounting can still be beneficial to firm-level investment
decisions within a single country. With this in mind, this study applies single country analysis
by focusing on the Chinese economy, which can overcome some of the criticisms of crosscountry studies, while holding constant of institutional factors that may be correlated with
corporate investment decisions.
Finally, this study also contributes from a methodology perspective. In a related line of
research, Ahmed and Duellman (2011) and Garcia Lara et al. (2016) focus on indirect
measures of investment efficiency, such as firm future profitability. However, these indirect
measures of investment efficiency are inferred and rely on ex post manifestation of
investment decisions, and direct measure is scarce. In a departure from, but complementary to
these studies, this paper directly and explicitly examines the issue that how accounting
conservatism affects firm investment efficiency, measured by the sensitivity of investment
expenditure to investment opportunities (Chen et al., 2011).
The remaining part of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
background of the stimulus package in China and develops the main hypotheses. Section 3
presents the model and data. Section 4 shows the empirical results and discusses the
implications. Section 5 shows the additional analysis and Section 6 concludes.
2. Hypothesis development
2.1 Chinese stimulus package
It is agreed that the Chinese economy has been hit heavily by the global financial crisis
in 2008, and started to slowdown in the second half of 2008. In response to the global
financial crisis, the Chinese government officially announced an economic stimulus package
on the 5th November 2008, with the intention to restore domestic economic growth. This
stimulus package was implemented from the fourth quarter of 2008 through to the end of
2010, and emphasized the expansion of the bank credit availability and increased investment
spending by 4 trillion RMB, which accounts for 12.5% of total GDP in China in 2008. Of the
total 4 trillion plan, the central government directly funded 1.18 trillion of the investment,
which is 30% of the overall program, and the rest was funded by local governments.
Meanwhile, a loose monetary policy was also emphasized by the central government to
provide bank credit to support these investment activities (Naughton, 2009). In practice, there
were 6 tranches of disbursement of the stimulus package, namely 108 billion in the fourth
5

quarter of 2008, 130 billion, 70 billion, 80 billion and 223.8 billion respectively from the first
to fourth quarters of 2009, and 992.7 billion in 2010. Altogether, the central government
actually funded a stimulus package of 1.6 trillion, which is more than originally planned.
Meanwhile, local governments actively echoed the stimulus package announced by the
central government, and contributed about 75% of fixed investments through budgetary
expenditure at the regional level. In particular, by the end of 2008, 24 out of 31
administrative regions in China announced individual investment plan spending over various
years. Those regions with larger investment plans are usually richer and have a more
developed financial system, so that they usually have more bank credit available even during
the normal times (Firth et al., 2009; Fan et al., 2011). For example, Yunnan and Hubei
Provinces announced 3 trillion and 7 trillion RMB investment plans, respectively.2
When central government announced the stimulus package, detailed information of the
investment capital distribution was also provided. According to the initial plan, 45% of the
total investment would be awarded to transport and power infrastructure and 9.25% to rural
village infrastructure. Later on in early 2009, capital distribution was revised by reducing the
investment in transport and power infrastructure from 45% to 37.5%. The proportion of
investments in other areas was increased slightly. When summarizing the investment capital
distribution across the industries classified by the China Securities Regulatory Commission
(CSRC), it is evident that capital distribution has been highly concentrated in the more
favoured industries included in the Chinese Five Year Plans, such as construction, hightechnology and culture (Liu et al., 2016)3.
2.2 Accounting conservatism and bank lending incentives
The interest conflicts between shareholders and creditors provide incentives for
shareholders to expropriate wealth from creditors, especially when firms approach financial
distress. In order to protect their interests, creditors demand timely information about the
value of the firms’ assets. This becomes more significant in the event of liquidation due to
stronger incentives of shareholders to delay the recognition of bad news for fear of losing
control rights to firms’ assets. Existing literature has documented systematic evidence of
lenders’ demands for conservative accounting and better terms of borrowing rewarded to
conservative borrowers (Zhang, 2008; Haw et al., 2014; Nikolaev, 2010).
2

Please see Liu et al. (2016) for detailed summary of the individual plans of each region, and the source can be
obtained from the following links: http://www.china.com.cn/economic/txt/2008-11/24/content_16813059.htm,
and http://www.csg.cn/epaper/html/2014-05/27/content_55643.htm.
3
This classification is based on the information from the website at:
http://www.china.com.cn/2009lianghui/2009-03/06/content_17387623.htm.
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Thus, many accounting-based debt covenants are required to restrain shareholders from
opportunistic expropriations, which are only binding if the financial reporting system
recognizes the deterioration of a firms’ financial position. In this regard, conservative
accounting can improve the effectiveness of these covenants, as it is the asymmetric
timeliness of recognizing bad news as losses than good news as gains (Basu, 1997). In theory,
accounting conservatism accelerates debt covenant violations and leads to more timely
transfer of control rights from borrowers to lenders (Watts, 2003). Clearly, creditors will
benefit from borrowers’ adoption of conservative accounting with reduced credit risks, and
are thus more likely to lend.
Due to either moral hazard or adverse selection concerns, firms still face capital rationing
by creditors, and creditors are reluctant to lend when hit with the negative shock of capital
supply which may result in unexpected increases of default risks of borrowers (Zhang, 2008;
Balakrishnan et al., 2015). However, the stimulus package in China leads to an exogenous
increase of bank loan supply and banks are required to rapidly ramp up their lending due to
political pressures, regardless of firms’ creditworthiness. Built on the above discussion, it is
expected that the beneficial effect of conservative accounting becomes less pronounced, and
firms with more conservative accounting experience a less increase in bank borrowing
following the implementation of the stimulus package. Therefore, the first hypothesis to be
tested is as follows:
H1: Accounting conservatism can increase firms’ borrowing which becomes less
significant following the implementation of the stimulus package.
2.3 Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency
Conservative accounting has a straightforward influence in rectifying investment
inefficiency through improving financing capacity and mitigating agency conflicts. Due to
these agency conflicts, shareholders are likely to undertake risky projects, or even those
projects with negative net present value (NPV), at the expense of creditors (Klock et al., 2005;
Chen et al., 2011), no matter whether their investment opportunities are promising or not,
leading to severe inefficient investment.
Under conservative accounting, any losses from poorly performing investment will be
timely recognized which is likely to violate debt covenants, so shareholders’ ex ante
incentives to undertake negative NPV projects are greatly reduced (Ahmed and Duellman,
2011; Garcia Lara et al., 2016). Therefore, accounting conservatism is an efficient
mechanism to ensure positive NPV project investments and results in efficient investment.
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The above expectation, relating conservatism to investment efficiency, is also consistent
with the prior argument that debt financing demands accounting conservatism (Watts, 2003a).
As the fixed-income investors, lenders are usually concerned about their downside risks and
face limited upside potentials, so they demand conservative accounting to timely recognize
bad news which can also reduce default risks and their monitoring costs (Zhang, 2008). In
this regard, conservative accounting is employed to protect lenders’ interests and restrict
managers/shareholders’ wealth expropriation from lenders by undertaking projects with
negative NPV. In addition, as accounting conservatism is an efficient contracting mechanism
in mitigating agency problems (Ahmed et al., 2002; Watts, 2003; LaFond and Roychowdhury,
2008; Garcia Lara et al., 2016), and severe agency conflicts usually lead to investment
inefficiency (Aivazian et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2011), accounting conservatism is
consistently expected to enhance investment efficiency.
The influence of accounting conservatism is expected to be less significant following the
stimulus package. As discussed above, during the post-stimulus package period, banks
increase their lending substantially and these bank-dependent firms experience more capital
availability. Thus, firm investment activities are boosted due to more sufficient capital to
fund all profitable investment opportunities as well as suboptimal investments, resulting in a
less efficient investment. Therefore, the second hypothesis to be tested is as follows:
H2: Accounting conservatism can increase firms’ investment efficiency which is less
significant following the onset of the implementation of the stimulus package.
2.4 Ownership structure and accounting conservatism
The above influences of accounting conservatism on bank lending and investment
efficiency after the crisis are subject to ownership structure as state capitalism in China
differentiates SOEs from non-SOEs (Chen et al., 2010). SOEs are ultimately controlled by
the government which aims to achieve social and political objectives such as social stability,
so they may not be permitted to be bankrupt and are able to negotiate with the government
for ex ante policy favour such as lower financing costs and tax relief. In addition, the soft
budget constraint towards SOEs also suggests that SOEs are more likely to receive
government funding especially when they run into financial troubles. So SOEs would have a
lower default risk. Moreover, the financial system in China is still controlled by the
government, and the state owned banks are inclined to lend to SOEs due to political pressure
without bearing financial consequence. The above discussion suggests that lenders are less
concerned about the default risks of SOEs and thus less likely to demand conservative
accounting (Chen et al., 2010).
8

Moreover, Chen et al. (2011) argue that state capitalism will inevitably alter the objective
function of SOEs to one preferred by politicians which leads to investment inefficiency. Ex
ante, due to multiple objectives of the government, SOEs are not always undertaking
profitable investment opportunities. Ex post, when investments fail to produce expected
returns, it is difficult for SOEs to reduce or even terminate the investment due to potential
conflicts with government policies.
Based on above discussions, it is logically expected that accounting conservatism has
insignificant and limited influence on firm financing capacity and improving investment
efficiency in SOEs, compared with non-SOEs.
In addition, the Chinese government announced an economic stimulus package which
was exercised by government direct lending through the state-owned banking system, and
most of the capital derived from this stimulus package was flowing to SOEs to help the whole
economy to recover through increasing bank loan supply and boosting firm investment. In
this sense, compared with non-SOEs, SOEs face less restrictions of bank lending and are thus
less likely to deter their investment activities. In addition, these bank loans are considered as
free resources rather than financial obligations, which further encourage SOEs to engage in
suboptimal investments, no matter whether the investment opportunities are promising or not.
Coupled with the insignificant influence of accounting conservatism in SOEs, it is expected
that disappearing beneficial effects of accounting conservatism on obtaining more bank loans
and improving investment efficiency after the stimulus package are less significant in SOEs.
The next hypothesis to be tested is as follows:
H3: The influence of accounting conservatism on bank lending incentives and firm
investment efficiency following the implementation of stimulus package becomes weaker in
SOEs.
3. Research design
3.1 Model specifications
To test main hypotheses, a difference-in-differences (DID) approach is employed to
compare the bank lending and firm investment efficiency before and after the implementation
of the stimulus package as a function of firm accounting conservatism. One potential issue in
the empirical design is that firms may change their accounting conservatism positions after
the implementation of the stimulus package, in which case the accounting conservatism is
endogenously determined. To address this potential issue, an identification strategy is applied
in spirit of Duchin et al. (2010) and Garcia-Appendini and Montoriol-Garriga (2013) in
which case that firm accounting conservatism is measured in the one quarter prior to the
9

implementation of the stimulus package, specifically at the end of the last fiscal quarter
ending prior to the 5th November 2008. As the unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity at the
firm-level may also create an endogeneity problem and bias the estimation results, firm fixed
effects are thus included to control for this issue.
To test hypothesis H1, the following regression model is developed in the spirit of Zhang
(2008) and Li (2015),

Bankloanit   0  1Stimulusit   2C _ Scoreit * Stimulusit   3 ROSit 1
  4 Assetit  5 Saleit 1   6Qit   7Tangibilit yit  8 Board it

(1)

  9 Indepit  10LnGDPit  Firm   it
where Bankloan is the ratio of total bank loans to total assets. C_Score is the measure of
accounting conservatism that will be explained later in Section 3.2. As discussed earlier, the
value of accounting conservatism for each firm is measured in one quarter prior to the
implementation of the stimulus package. Stimulus is a dummy variable, equals to 1 for firmquarter observations following the implementation of the stimulus package and 0 otherwise.
As the stimulus package was implemented since the fourth quarter of 2008, so accounting
conservatism is measured in the third quarter of 2008, and firm-quarter observations after this
quarter are classified as post-stimulus package periods. α2 is used to test hypothesis H1, and
according to the discussion of the hypothesis, α2 is predicted to be significantly negative.
To test hypothesis H2, this study employs the standard investment equation to explore
the impacts of accounting conservatism on investment efficiency, following previous studies
(Aivazian et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2011). Specifically, the model is expressed as follows:

Investment   0  1C _ Scoreit * Qit 1   2C _ Scoreit * Qit 1 * Stimulus it
  3C _ Scoreit * Stimulus it   4Qit 1 * Stimulus it   5 Stimulus it   6Qit 1
  7 Levit 1  8 Assetit   9 Saleit 1  10Tangibilit yit  11Cashflowit

(2)

 12Board it  13Indepit  14LnGDPit  Firm   it
where Investment is firms’ investment expenditure, measured as the ratio of capital
expenditure (cash payments for fixed assets, intangible assets, and other long-term assets
from the cash flow statements, less cash receipts from selling these assets) to total assets at
the beginning of current quarter. This is consistent with Chen et al. (2011) and Xu et al.
(2011). Q is Tobin’s Q, defined as the ratio of firm market value to replacement value, which
is the proxy for investment opportunities. Investment efficiency is reflected by the sensitivity
of investment expenditure to investment opportunities, and 2 is used to test hypothesis H2.
According to the discussion of the hypothesis, 2 is predicted to be significantly negative.
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Following Firth et al. (2009) and Zheng and Zhu (2013), a set of control variables, such
as total assets, sales level and tangible assets, which have potential effect on bank loan ratio,
are also included in equation (1). Following Chen et al. (2011) and Zheng and Zhu (2013), a
set of control variables, such as Tobin’s Q and leverage, are also included in equation (2)
which have a potential effect on firm investment expenditures. Moreover, as bank lending
and firm investment are likely to be driven by macroeconomic conditions, GDP per capita at
the provincial level is also included in both equations to control for the macroeconomic
conditions4.
3.2 Measuring accounting conservatism
The tests require firm-specific accounting conservatism measures at the end of the third
quarter of 2008 to be entered into both equations. Following Khan and Watts (2009), the
C_Score is calculated and used as a primary measure for firm-specific accounting
conservatism. This method has been used by Chen et al. (2013) in the context of China.
To calculate the C_Score, the following cross-sectional equation is estimated first for
each quarter in the sample:

Eit / Pit 1  (0  1Sizeit  2 Levit  3 MBit )  DRit ( 0  1Sizeit   2 Levit   3 MBit )
 Rit (  0  1Sizeit   2 Levit  3 MBit )  DRit * Rit ( 0  1Sizeit  2 Levit  3 MBit )   it

(3)

where E is earnings per share, P is quarter-end share price, R is quarterly buy-and-hold return,
and DR is a dummy variable equal to 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise. Size is the log of
market value of equity, Lev is leverage ratio, and MB is market-to-book ratio. Then C_Score
for each firm-quarter is calculated as:

C _ Scoreit   0   1Sizeit   2 Levit   3 MBit

(4)

As there is no commonly accepted proxy for accounting conservatism, this study also
employs two alternative measures of firm-specific conservatism to check the robustness of
the results. The first one is market-value based proxy (Con_Acc) and calculated as the bookto-market ratio multiplied by negative one, following Beaver and Ryan (2000). The second is
accrual-based proxy (Con_Mar) and calculated as the income before extra-ordinary items,
less cash flows from operations, plus depreciation expense deflated by average total assets at
the beginning of current quarter, and averaged over a 3-quarter period centred on quarter t,
following Givoly and Hayn (2000). These two proxies have been used by Ahmed and
Duellman (2007). The following part reports the empirical results using C_Score as the proxy

4

Thanks the reviewer for this suggestion.

11

for accounting conservatism and the results using alternative proxies are available on request.
Definitions of all variables used in this study are listed in the Appendix.
4. Empirical results
4.1 Summary statistics
The sample of this study includes quarterly data of all Chinese listed firms on both
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges between 2003 and 2014. Following the common
procedure, the final sample for empirical analysis is obtained as follows. Specifically, firmquarter observations flagged with ST or *ST 5 , from financial industry or with missing
information are excluded, and the final sample includes 62,700 firm-quarter observations.
All relevant data are obtained from the Chinese Securities Market and Accounting
Research (CSMAR) database. In particular, the stock price and stock return are gathered from
the Stock Market Trading database. Financial and governance information is gathered from
the Financial Statement database and Listed Firm Governance database. To eliminate the
outlier effects, all the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% level. Table 1 shows the
summary statistics of all variables. The summary shows that the mean (median) of the bank
loans and investment expenditure are 23.99% (23.09%) and 1.70% (0.91%), which are quite
similar to those reported by Zheng and Zhu (2013) and Xu et al. (2011). C_Score has a mean
of 0.235 and median of 0.214 as of the third quarter of 2008, which are broadly comparable
to those reported by Chen et al. (2013). The summary statistics of the other two proxies for
accounting conservatism are also consistent with existing studies (Ahmed and Duellman,
2007).
[Insert Table 1 here]
Before the multivariate analysis, this study first conducts some univariate tests to
compare the differences in bank lending and firm investment between firms with more and
less conservative accounting, before and after the implementation of the stimulus package. To
do so, sample firms are divided into two groups based on the median values of the C_Score in
the third quarter of 2008, and those firms with higher values of the C_Score are grouped as
more conservative accounting and others are grouped as less conservative accounting. The
comparison results are reported in Table 2. In order to accommodate both bank lending and
firm investment in the same table, bank loan ratios are reported in the table and investment
expenditures are reported in the brackets. Consistent with the hypotheses, the comparisons for
5

ST stands for Special Treatment and refers to the listed firms that have already had negative net profits for two
consecutive years. *ST refers to the listed firms that have already had negative net profits for 3 consecutive
years and thus have the probability of being delisted from the stock exchanges.
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the full sample, SOE subsample and non-SOE subsample are reported separately in Panels A,
B and C. First, as can be seen from Panel A of the table, more conservative firms are likely to
receive more bank loans before the implementation of the stimulus package (t-value of the
difference is 4.36), while this effect becomes weaker after the stimulus package (t-value of
the difference is 1.99). Difference-in-difference test shows this change is statistically
significant (t-value between before and after is 2.27). These results are consistent with the
main hypothesis that conservative accounting is beneficial for firms while this beneficial
effect becomes weaker after the expansion of bank credit. Panel B shows the comparisons for
SOEs and it is apparent that conservative accounting is not necessarily a factor in obtaining
external finance and firm investment in SOEs, supporting the hypothesis and the argument by
Chen et al. (2010). Panel C shows the comparisons for non-SOEs which is similar to the
comparisons for the full sample.
[Insert Table 2 here]
4.2 Accounting conservatism and bank lending incentives
Table 3 presents the results of testing for H1, the influence of accounting conservatism
on bank lending incentives before and after the implementation of the stimulus package.
Column 1 presents the results of the baseline equation and column 2 includes an interaction
term of C_Score*Stimulus. In column 1, it is observed that the estimated coefficient of
Stimulus is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. This result suggests that when
hit by the financial crisis, the stimulus package can rectify the liquidity of the banking sector,
and firms experienced an increase in their bank borrowing. Specifically, the estimated
coefficient of positive 0.037 suggests that the quarterly bank loan ratio by average firms
increased by 0.037 percentage points following the stimulus package, an increase of 15.42%
relative to an unconditional mean of 23.99% per quarter.
Column 2 shows that the estimated coefficient of C_Score*Stimulus is negative and
significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the significant increase in bank borrowing after
the implementation of the stimulus package becomes weaker for firms with more
conservative accounting. The estimated coefficient of negative 0.038 indicates that after the
stimulus package, the quarterly bank loan ratio increased by 0.031 percentage points for firms
with more conservative accounting, which is significantly lower than the increase of 0.069
percentage point by firms with less conservative accounting. In addition, control variables
exhibit expected signs consistent with prior studies (Zheng and Zhu, 2013). Overall, the
results in Table 3 are consistent with H1 that firms with more conservative accounting
experience a less increase in bank borrowing following the implementation of the stimulus
13

package than firms with aggressive accounting. In other words, bank lending becomes less
responsive to accounting conservatism following the positive shock to the capital market in
China.
[Insert Table 3 here]

4.3 Accounting conservatism and firm investment efficiency
Table 4 reports the results for testing H2, the influence of accounting conservatism on
firm investment efficiency before and after the implementation of the stimulus package.
Column 1 presents the results of the baseline regression, and columns 2 and 3 further include
interaction terms. Across three specifications, Stimulus shows positive and significant
coefficients, suggesting that firms experienced a sharp increase in investment after the
implementation of the stimulus package.
The interaction terms from columns 2 and 3 are key results. In column 2, the coefficient
of C_Score*Q is positive and significant at the 5% level, which is partially consistent with
hypothesis H2. This result shows that investment expenditures are significantly more
sensitive to investment opportunities for firms with more conservative reporting, indicating
that more conservative firms are more efficient in their investments. In column 3, the
estimated coefficient of C_Score*Q*Stimulus is negative and significant at the 1% level,
suggesting that the positive effect of accounting conservatism on firm investment efficiency
becomes weaker after the stimulus package when the government encourages investment
activities. Overall, these results are fully consistent with H2 that the beneficial effect of
conservative accounting is mitigated by expansion of monetary policy, indicating that firm
financial reporting is subject to the institutional environment and monetary policy. Again, in
relation to control variables, the signs and magnitudes are expected and consistent with those
reported in prior studies (Firth et al., 2008; Chen et al., 2011).
[Insert Table 4 here]
These empirical results face a potential issue of reverse causality. Though it is argued
that the implementation of the stimulus package is an exogenous shock in response to the
financial crisis, it could also be the case that the implementation of the stimulus package is
exercised in response to the declining of bank borrowing and firm investment resulting from
the financial crisis 6 . To address this reverse causality issue, the dynamic effects of the
implementation of the stimulus package are investigated, using a method which is similar to
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Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). Empirically, the Stimulus dummy variable is replaced by
four dummy variables: Beforet-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations one quarter
preceding the implementation of the stimulus package. Current is a dummy variable equal to
1 for observations in the quarter when the stimulus package is implemented. Aftert+1 is a
dummy variable equal to 1 for observations one quarter after the implementation of the
stimulus package. Aftert+2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations two quarters or
more after the implementation of the stimulus package. The variable Beforet-1 allows for the
exploration of the reverse causality of any effect of bank lending and firm investment
efficiency exists before the implementation of the stimulus package. The results reported in
Table 5 show that the estimated coefficients of Beforet-1 and its interaction terms are
statistically insignificant, suggesting that such an effect is not found prior to the
implementation of the stimulus package.
[Insert Table 5 here]

5. Additional evidence
5.1 Ownership structure and accounting conservatism
Table 6 lists the results for testing hypothesis H3, concerning the different influences of
accounting conservatism between SOEs and non-SOEs. Empirically, a firm is identified as
SOE or non-SOE as of the third quarter of 2008, and both equations (1) and (2) are estimated
for both SOE and non-SOE subsamples separately, and the results of key variables are
reported in each column of Table 6.
Again, interaction terms are the key interests. In Panel A for bank lending regression, the
estimated coefficient of C_Score*Stimulus is -0.073 for non-SOEs which is significant at the
1% level (t-value is -2.93), and -0.024 for SOEs which is significant at the 5% level (t-value
is -1.97). This result suggests that the beneficial effect of conservative accounting on
obtaining more bank loans becomes mitigated after the stimulus package, which is more
significant for non-SOEs, reflected by the larger absolute value of the coefficient for the nonSOEs. In Panel B for firm investment regression, the estimated coefficient of
C_Score*Q*Stimulus is -0.056 for non-SOEs which is significant at the 1% level (t-value is
-2.78), and -0.018 for SOEs which is insignificant (t-value is -0.60). This result suggests that
the enhancing effect of accounting conservatism on firm investment efficiency becomes
weaker after the stimulus package, which is significant for non-SOEs, reflected by the larger
absolute value of the coefficient for the non-SOEs. To formally test whether the influence of
accounting conservatism on bank lending incentives and firm investment efficiency are
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significantly different between SOEs and non-SOEs, Chow tests are conducted. In both
Panels, Chow tests are 5.66 and 7.33, and are significant at both 5% and 1% level, which
empirically validate the significantly different influences of accounting conservatism between
SOEs and non-SOEs. These results are consistent with hypothesis H3, and also corroborate
the findings by Chen et al. (2010) that SOEs are less likely to adopt conservative accounting
standards in China.
[Insert Table 6 here]
5.2 Industrial and regional variations
The Chinese central government launched the economic stimulus package in response to
the financial crisis to increase the bank loan supply, and its influence is expected to be
different across industries and regions. As summarized in section 2.1, the composition of
investments had been directed toward specific industries that would boost consumption or
have a direct impact on people’s livelihood, such as transport and power infrastructure
(railways, roads, airports and the electricity grid), rural village infrastructure, environment
investment, affordable housing, technological innovation and education. Moreover, many
local governments also infused various capital levels to their own provinces. Thus, there are
large variations of capital injection and expansion across industries and regions. This section
aims to explore whether the influences of accounting conservatism documented above vary
across industries and regions. To do so, the full sample is divided into more and less favoured
industries and regions. Specifically, more favoured industries include those industries
mentioned by the stimulus package, including Construction, Technology, Culture and
Conglomerate. More favoured regions include those provinces whose infused capital level is
above the median value. Similar to the measurement of the firm accounting conservatism
discussed in section 3.1, the identification of favoured industries and regions are also
conducted in the one quarter prior to the implementation of the stimulus package. Empirically,
both equations (1) and (2) are estimated for both industry and region groups and the results
are reported in Tables 7 and 8.
The same as previous tables, the interaction terms C_Score*Stimulus and
C_Score*Q*Stimulus are the key results from both Panel A and Panel B. Referring to both
Tables 7 and 8, it is observed that the estimated coefficients of these two interaction terms are
more significant for firms from less favoured industries and less favoured regions. Again,
Chow tests are conducted to test the significance of the different influences of conservative
accounting between both subsamples. Overall, the partitions of industries and regions provide
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further evidence to explore the causal effect of accounting conservatism on bank lending
incentives and firm investment decisions, and the general results are consistent with the main
arguments that the beneficial effect of accounting conservatism becomes less pronounced
when facing positive shock to the capital market.
However, these results seem to be counterintuitive that firms from less favoured
industries and less favoured regions receive less bank credit, so that these firms should be less
affected by the stimulus package. Actually, the explanations of these results follow the same
rationale which is used to explain the comparisons between SOEs and non-SOEs, and it is
argued that accounting conservatism matters more in firms from less favoured industries and
less favoured regions. On the one hand, these favoured industries are actually included by the
industries favoured by the Chinese Five Year Plans. In China, every five years the Chinese
government announces a Five Year Plan identifying some specific industries that will be
more supported or favoured by government policy. Though the favoured industries of each
Five Year Plan vary to some extent, the industries favoured by the stimulus package are all
included in these plans. On the other hand, these favoured regions are more developed
regions and have more developed financial systems and more bank credit available (Firth et
al., 2009; Fan et al., 2011). These arguments indicate that firms from favoured industries and
favoured regions can receive more bank credit and the influence of accounting conservatism
on bank lending and investment efficiency is expected to be less significant in these firms,
compared with firms from less favoured industries and less favoured regions. Moreover,
other firms still face a substantial expansion of bank credit after the implementation of
stimulus package. Therefore, the influence of accounting conservatism could be significantly
beneficial in these firms from less favoured industries and regions before the implementation
of the stimulus package and this beneficial effect becomes weaker after the implementation
of the stimulus package. In addition, the unreported univariate test shows that the average
bank loan ratio and firm investment expenditures are both significantly higher for firms from
the favoured industries and favoured regions before and after the implementation of the
stimulus package, but the magnitudes of the increases of bank loans and investments are
significantly higher for firms from less favoured industries and less favoured regions.
[Insert Table 7 here]
[Insert Table 8 here]
5.3 Accounting conservatism and conflicts of interest
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It has been argued in the hypothesis that conservative accounting is required by the
debtholders, so that conservative accounting is effective in mitigating the conflict of interest
between debtholders and shareholders/managers and protecting the interests of debtholders.
Then, it is expected that the beneficial effect of conservative accounting should be stronger in
firms where the conflict of interest between debtholders and shareholders/managers is more
severe and debtholders’ interests are at risk7. For example, when firms face the potential of
financial distress, conflict of interests between debtholders and shareholders/managers
becomes more severe as shareholders/managers may undertake riskier behaviours to
expropriate debtholders which may then reduce the debtholders’ claims. Moreover, as
documented by both Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) and Lin et al. (2011), the deviation
between the control rights and cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders leads to
expropriation incentives and increases the credit risks concerned by debtholders and
amplifies the agency problem between shareholders and debtholders. From this perspective,
this section conducts some additional analysis to formally test this prediction. Empirically,
consistent with the previous subsample regressions, the full sample is divided into two groups
based on two partitioning variables. One is the Z-score, which is the proxy for the magnitude
of financial distress potential, consistent with Altman (1968). The other one is the controlownership wedge, consistent with Boubakri and Ghouma (2010) and Lin et al. (2011).
Empirically, both Z-score and control-ownership wedge are measured as of the third quarter
of 2008 in this analysis. Those firms with larger Z-scores than the industry median level are
grouped as less financial distress and other firms are grouped as more financial distress.
Firms are also divided into two groups according to whether there is a control-ownership
wedge. Then, both equations (1) and (2) are estimated to each subsample and the results are
reported in Tables 9 and 10.
The same as previous tables, the interaction terms with Stimulus in both tables are of
interest. As can be seen from Panel A of Table 9, the estimated coefficient of
C_Score*Stimulus is -0.062 for firms with more financial distress which is significant at the 1%
level (t-value is -2.78), and -0.013 for firms with less financial distress which is insignificant.
The Chow test also confirms the significant difference in the influence of conservative
accounting on bank lending between these two groups after the implementation of the
stimulus package. The results in Panel B of Table 9 also show that the disappearing effect of
conservative accounting after the implementation of the stimulus package is more significant

7

Thanks the reviewer for this test.

18

for firms with more financial distress. The results in Table 10 show a similar pattern to those
in Table 9. These results provide empirical support to the main argument that conservative
accounting provides benefits for firms through mitigating the conflict of interests between
debtholders and shareholders/managers.
[Insert Table 9 here]
[Insert Table 10 here]
5.4 Accounting conservatism and future profitability
During the normal period, accounting conservatism is expected to be beneficial in terms
of more bank borrowing and more efficient investments. Recent studies argue that efficient
investments are more likely to lead to higher future cash flows, thus firms with more
conservative accounting should have higher future profitability (Ahmed and Duellman, 2011;
Garcia Lara et al., 2016). Following this line of research, it is expected that the positive
relationship between accounting conservatism and future profitability becomes weaker after
the stimulus package when the beneficial effect of accounting conservatism is mitigated.
Consistent with Ahmed and Duellman (2011), the ratio of operating cash flows to total sales
(Cashflow) in quarter t+3 is applied as the proxy for future profitability. In addition, return
on assets (ROA) is also applied as an alternative proxy that has been used to measure
profitability extensively.
Empirically, these two profitability proxies are regressed against key variables and a set
of control variables, and the results are reported in Table 11. As can be seen from both
specifications, the estimated coefficients of C_Score*Stimulus are negative and statistically
significant. These results suggest that firms with conservative accounting exhibit a higher
future profitability, while this positive association becomes weaker after the stimulus package.
The general results are consistent with main arguments and support the hypotheses.
[Insert Table 11 here]
6. Conclusion
Whether and how financial reporting affects the real economy is of great interest to both
academics and policymakers. This study contributes to this area of academic work by
providing evidence on the role of financial reporting in affecting bank lending incentives and
firm investment efficiency, using the Chinese government’s stimulus package as a quasiexperiment. Specifically, this stimulus package represents a positive and exogenous shock to
credit supply which results in credit expansion. This is in contrast to the situation in the US,
where financial crisis results in a loss of liquidity in the banking system and credit
contraction (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010). In addition, the stimulus package in China also
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encourages investment activities. Given these two distinct features following the
implementation of the stimulus package, the influence of accounting conservatism is
expected to exhibit different patterns from those reported in the US.
Using a large sample of China’s listed firms between 2003 and 2014, this study finds that
firms bank borrowing increases significantly after the stimulus package which is less
significant for firms with conservative accounting. This study also finds that these firms make
more efficient investment, which becomes less efficient after the stimulus package. Further
analysis document that the above findings are less significant for firms with sufficient
external financing, namely SOEs and firms from government favoured industries and regions.
The above findings are more significant for firms with more severe interest conflicts between
debtholders and shareholders. These results are robust for alternative specification and
alternative measurements for accounting conservatism.
Existing studies have documented the beneficial effects of accounting conservatism for
both borrowers and lenders, which is more pronounced when facing capital contraction
(Zhang, 2008; Francis et al., 2013; Balakrishnan et al., 2015). However, this study offers
additional evidence on the role of accounting conservatism using a counterexample of capital
expansion in China, which presents a complementary perspective to existing literature. The
main findings demonstrate that the influence of financial reporting becomes less pronounced
when firms are likely to be favourably treated in terms of external financing when lenders are
less likely to demand for conservative accounting. This study reveals important implications
for policymakers in emerging markets. First, to restore economic growth in response to
financial crisis, governments should increase their ability to create externalities and provide
more profitable investment opportunities, while reducing government intervention in business
through government-oriented policies. Second, the role of accounting conservatism should be
emphasized, especially during the post-crisis period, to prevent firms from engaging in
aggressive and risk-taking behaviours which may have long-term inefficient effects. More
importantly, as the key component of the whole economy, the corporate sector should take
the main responsibility for contributing to economy recovery instead of relying on
government policies. In this institutional environment, the allocation of resources and
corporate investment are of more efficiency, which is beneficial to economy recovery after
the financial crisis at the country level.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
Mean
Median
25%
75%
Bankloan
23.99%
23.09%
10.01%
35.33%
Investment
1.70%
0.91%
0.27%
2.33%
C_Score
0.235
0.214
0.205
0.267
Con_Acc
-0.010
-0.003
-0.022
0.015
Con_Mar
-0.123
-0.104
-0.161
-0.066
Q
1.70
1.31
1.07
1.86
Lev
52.38%
52.10%
37.40%
65.50%
Asset
21.63
21.52
20.78
22.36
Sale
18.43%
14.65%
8.50%
23.18%
Tangibility
24.41%
22.62%
13.82%
35.55%
ROS
4.28%
4.92%
1.02%
10.83%
ROA
1.55%
1.39%
0.23%
3.59%
Cashflow
4.89%
4.52%
0.86%
11.07%
Board
9.31
9
9
10
Indep
0.36
0.33
0.33
0.375
LnGDP
10.25
10.50
10.19
10.90
Z-score
2.33
2.04
1.37
2.89
Wedge
6.25%
0.25%
0
11.36%
This table presents the summary statistics of all the variables used in this study. These variables are defined the
same as those in the Appendix. Specifically, C_Score, Con_Acc, Con_Mar, Z-score and Wedge are measured as
of the third quarter of 2008, which is one quarter prior to the implementation of the stimulus package.

Table 2. Univariate tests of bank lending and firm investment
Accounting conservatism
More
Less
Panel A: Full sample
Before
23.96%
21.87%
(1.66%)
(1.61%)
After
25.86%
24.00%
(1.79%)
(1.72%)
Change of the difference between Before and After
Panel B: SOEs
Before

24.15%
(1.75%)
After
26.80%
(1.91%)
Change of the difference between Before and After
Panel C: Non-SOEs
Before

23.68%
(1.59%)
After
24.52%
(1.66%)
Change of the difference between Before and After

22.31%
(1.70%)
25.28%
(1.86%)

t-values

4.36***
(2.41***)
1.99**
(2.35**)
2.27**
(0.23)
1.55
(1.13)
0.98
(0.99)
0.55
(0.20)

21.25%
(1.49%)
22.16%
(1.58%)

4.36***
(3.33***)
2.35**
(1.95*)
2.88***
(2.33**)
This table reports the difference tests of bank lending and firm investment between firms with more and less
conservative accounting before and after the implementation of stimulus package. The values of bank loan ratio
are reported in the table and values of firm investment are reported in the brackets. *, ** and *** indicate the
significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 3. The effect of accounting conservatism on bank lending incentives before and after the
implementation of the stimulus package
Dependent variable is total bank loan ratio
Stimulus
0.037***
0.069**
(3.95)
(4.58)
C_Score*Stimulus
-0.038**
(-2.27)
ROS
0.102***
0.099***
(4.15)
(4.34)
Asset
0.055***
0.055***
(5.35)
(5.18)
Sale
0.115***
0.116***
(21.45)
(21.73)
Q
0.004***
0.005***
(6.75)
(7.51)
Tangibility
0.144***
0.137***
(12.62)
(12.08)
Board
-0.018
-0.020
(-0.72)
(-1.32)
Indep
-0.053
-0.050
(-0.75)
(-1.51)
LnGDP
0.002**
0.002**
(2.02)
(2.02)
Constant
-0.855***
-0.836***
(-6.43)
(-6.32)
Quarter fixed effects
Included
Included
Firm fixed effects
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.14
0.15
Observations
62700
62700
This table reports the results of the effect of accounting conservatism on bank lending incentives before and
after the implementation of the stimulus package. Definitions of all variables are the same as in Appendix. Tvalues are reported in brackets, ** and *** indicate the significance levels of 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 4. The effect of accounting conservatism on firm investment efficiency before and after the
implementation of the stimulus package
Dependent variable is investment expenditure
C_Score*Q
0.014**
0.029**
(2.29)
(2.55)
C_Score*Q*Stimulus
-0.038***
(-3.06)
C_Score*Stimulus
-0.167
(-1.51)
Q*Stimulus
-0.019**
(-2.06)
Stimulus
0.004***
0.004***
0.009***
(5.31)
(5.26)
(7.01)
Q
0.004***
0.007***
0.012***
(2.90)
(2.66)
(2.92)
Lev
-0.065***
-0.064***
-0.059***
(-9.18)
(-9.14)
(-8.31)
Asset
0.015***
0.015***
0.016***
(7.98)
(7.78)
(8.25)
Sale
0.066**
0.065**
0.066**
(5.44)
(5.43)
(5.52)
Tangibility
0.102***
0.101***
0.108***
(4.08)
(4.06)
(4.32)
Cashflow
0.569***
0.568***
0.569***
(11.31)
(11.29)
(11.31)
Board
0.004
0.004
0.004
(1.15)
(1.14)
(1.07)
Indep
0.002
0.002
0.002
(0.63)
(0.63)
(0.65)
LnGDP
0.009***
0.009***
0.009***
(4.40)
(4.40)
(4.42)
Constant
1.004***
1.008***
0.984***
(3.42)
(3.44)
(3.36)
Quarter fixed effects
Included
Included
Included
Firm fixed effects
Included
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.16
0.17
0.19
Observations
62700
62700
62700
This table reports the results of the effect of accounting conservatism on firm investment efficiency before and
after the implementation of the stimulus package. Definitions of all variables are the same as in Appendix. Tvalues are reported in brackets, ** and *** indicate the significance levels of 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 5. The dynamic effects of the influence of the implementation of the stimulus package
Bank lending incentive regression Firm investment efficiency regression
Beforet-1
0.018
0.004
(1.46)
(1.63)
Current
0.043*
0.004***
(1.90)
(3.80)
Aftert+1
0.062**
0.015***
(2.03)
(3.59)
Aftert+2
0.093***
0.016***
(9.74)
(6.10)
C_Score*Beforet-1
-0.168
(-0.96)
C_Score*Current
-0.205***
(-3.42)
C_Score*Aftert+1
-0.239***
(-4.04)
C_Score*Aftert+2
-0.420***
(-3.24)
C_Score*Q*Beforet-1
0.041
(1.50)
C_Score*Q*Current
-0.048*
(-1.92)
C_Score*Q*Aftert+1
-0.022*
(-1.91)
C_Score*Q*Aftert+2
-0.045***
(-5.52)
Control variables and other interaction terms from equations (1) and (2) are also included in each regression
Adjusted R2
0.12
0.15
Observations
62700
62700
This table reports the results of the dynamic effects of the implementation of the stimulus package on the
relationship between accounting conservatism and bank lending incentives and firm investment efficiency.
Beforet-1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations one quarter preceding the implementation of the
stimulus package. Current is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations in the quarter when the stimulus
package is implemented. Aftert+1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations one quarter after the
implementation of the stimulus package. Aftert+2 is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations two quarters or
more after the implementation of the stimulus package. Definitions of all variables are the same as in Appendix.
T-values are reported in brackets, *, ** and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1%,
respectively.
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Table 6. The influence of accounting conservatism: SOEs vs. non-SOEs
SOEs
Non-SOEs
Panel A: Bank lending incentive regression
Stimulus
0.042**
0.138***
(2.20)
(6.58)
C_Score*Stimulus
-0.024**
-0.073***
(-1.97)
(-2.93)
Control variables from equation (1) are also included
Chow tests
5.66**
Adjusted R2
0.14
0.15
Observations
36833
25867
Panel B: Firm investment efficiency regression
C_Score*Q
0.069
0.023**
(1.02)
(2.15)
C_Score*Q*Stimulus
-0.018
-0.056***
(-0.60)
(-2.78)
Control variables and other interaction terms from equation (2) are also included
Chow tests
7.33***
Adjusted R2
0.13
0.17
Observations
36833
25867
This table reports the results of the effect of accounting conservatism on bank lending incentives and firm
investment efficiency before and after the implementation of the stimulus package for both SOEs and non-SOEs.
Definitions of all variables are the same as in Appendix. Chow tests report the significance of difference of the
interaction terms with Stimulus between SOEs and non-SOEs. T-values are reported in brackets, ** and ***
indicate the significance levels of 5% and 1%, respectively.

Table 7. The influence of accounting conservatism: more favoured vs. less favoured industries
More favoured industries
Less favoured industries
Panel A: Bank lending incentive regression
Stimulus
0.022***
0.109***
(2.60)
(8.41)
C_Score*Stimulus
-0.029*
-0.095***
(-1.92)
(-8.71)
Control variables from equation (1) are also included
Chow tests
9.13***
Adjusted R2
0.19
0.28
Observations
20914
41786
Panel B: Firm investment efficiency regression
C_Score*Q
0.095
0.014***
(1.25)
(2.69)
C_Score*Q*Stimulus
-0.014
-0.041***
(-1.49)
(-3.35)
Control variables and other interaction terms from equation (2) are also included
Chow tests
6.12**
Adjusted R2
0.14
0.15
Observations
20914
41786
This table reports the results of the effect of accounting conservatism on bank lending incentives and firm
investment efficiency before and after the implementation of the stimulus package for firms from both more
favoured and less favoured industries. Definitions of all variables are the same as in Appendix. Chow tests
report the significance of difference of the interaction terms with Stimulus between firms from more favoured
and less favoured industries. T-values are reported in brackets, *, ** and *** indicate the significance levels of
10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 8. The influence of accounting conservatism: more favoured vs. less favoured regions
More favoured regions
Less favoured regions
Panel A: Bank lending incentive regression
Stimulus
0.053*
0.083***
(1.90)
(6.43)
C_Score*Stimulus
-0.030
-0.046***
(-1.43)
(-3.59)
Control variables from equation (1) are also included
Chow tests
8.56***
Adjusted R2
0.14
0.12
Observations
31664
31036
Panel B: Firm investment efficiency regression
C_Score*Q
0.016**
0.058***
(2.16)
(3.07)
C_Score*Q*Stimulus
-0.012
-0.064**
(-1.35)
(-2.37)
Control variables and other interaction terms from equation (2) are also included
Chow tests
4.45**
Adjusted R2
0.17
0.12
Observations
31664
31036
This table reports the results of the effect of accounting conservatism on bank lending incentives and firm
investment efficiency before and after the implementation of the stimulus package for firms from both more
favoured and less favoured regions. Definitions of all variables are the same as in Appendix. Chow tests report
the significance of difference of the interaction terms with Stimulus between firms from more favoured and less
favoured regions. T-values are reported in brackets, *, ** and *** indicate the significance levels of 10%, 5%
and 1%, respectively.
Table 9. The influence of accounting conservatism: more financial distress vs. less financial distress
More financial distress
Less financial distress
Panel A: Bank lending incentive regression
Stimulus
0.120***
0.015**
(3.95)
(2.26)
C_Score*Stimulus
-0.062***
-0.013
(-2.78)
(-1.15)
Control variables from equation (1) are also included
Chow tests
5.92**
Adjusted R2
0.16
0.13
Observations
30723
31977
Panel B: Firm investment efficiency regression
C_Score*Q
0.046**
0.017*
(2.30)
(1.92)
C_Score*Q*Stimulus
-0.040**
-0.016
(-2.28)
(-0.23)
Control variables and other interaction terms from equation (2) are also included
Chow tests
5.89**
Adjusted R2
0.18
0.15
Observations
30723
31977
This table reports the results of the effect of accounting conservatism on bank lending incentives and firm
investment efficiency before and after the implementation of the stimulus package for both firms with more
financial distress and less financial distress. Definitions of all variables are the same as in Appendix. Chow tests
report the significance of difference of the interaction terms with Stimulus between firms with more financial
distress and less financial distress. T-values are reported in brackets, ** and *** indicate the significance levels
of 5% and 1%, respectively.
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Table 10. The influence of accounting conservatism: with control-ownership wedge vs. without controlownership wedge
With control-ownership wedge
Without control-ownership wedge
Panel A: Bank lending incentive regression
Stimulus
0.086***
0.042***
(6.69)
(2.68)
C_Score*Stimulus
-0.040***
-0.029
(-4.00)
(-1.17)
Control variables from equation (1) are also included
Chow tests
6.23**
Adjusted R2
0.13
0.15
Observations
32353
30347
Panel B: Firm investment efficiency regression
C_Score*Q
-0.038***
-0.017
(-2.86)
(-1.32)
C_Score*Q*Stimulus
-0.050***
0.007
(-3.17)
(0.27)
Control variables and other interaction terms from equation (2) are also included
Chow tests
7.00***
Adjusted R2
0.13
0.13
Observations
32353
30347
This table reports the results of the effect of accounting conservatism on bank lending incentives and firm
investment efficiency before and after the implementation of the stimulus package for both firms with and
without control-ownership wedge. Definitions of all variables are the same as in Appendix. Chow tests report
the significance of difference of the interaction terms with Stimulus between firms with and without controlownership wedge. T-values are reported in brackets, ** and *** indicate the significance levels of 5% and 1%,
respectively.

Table 11. The effect of accounting conservatism on future profitability
Dependent variable
Cashflow
ROA
Stimulus
0.012***
0.006***
(4.27)
(8.19)
C_Score*Stimulus
-0.014**
-0.049***
(-2.05)
(-4.14)
Asset
-0.018***
-0.004***
(-30.46)
(-21.58)
Lev
0.018***
-0.003***
(7.55)
(-5.05)
Sale
0.365***
0.019***
(8.11)
(18.32)
Board
-0.01
-0.001
(-0.30)
(-0.21)
Indep
0.017**
0.006***
(1.96)
(2.88)
Constant
0.506***
0.082***
(33.98)
(20.53)
Quarter fixed effects
Included
Included
Firm fixed effects
Included
Included
Adjusted R2
0.15
0.08
Observations
59778
59778
This table reports the results of the effect of accounting conservatism on firm performance before and after the
implementation of the stimulus package. Definitions of all variables are the same as in Appendix. T-values are
reported in brackets, ** and *** indicate the significance levels of 5% and 1%, respectively.

30

Appendix. Variable definition
Variables
Definitions
C_Score
The proxy for accounting conservatism, measured in the third quarter of 2008
which is one quarter prior to the implementation of the stimulus package. Detailed
calculation is listed in section 3.2.
Stimulus
Equals 1 for firm-quarter observations falling in the post-stimulus period, and 0 for
the pre-stimulus period. In particular, pre-stimulus period covers 2003 to the third
quarter of 2008, and post-stimulus period covers the fourth quarter of 2008 to
2014.
Bankloan
The ratio of firm total bank loans to total assets in current quarter
Investment
Capital expenditure/Total assets in the current quarter
ROS
Net income/Sales in the current quarter
ROA
Net income/Total assets in the current quarter
Asset
Natural log of total assets in the current quarter
Sale
Net sales/Total assets in the current quarter
Tangibility
Tangible assets/Total assets in the current quarter
Q
Market value/Replacement value in the current quarter
Leverage (Lev)
Total debt/Total assets in the current quarter
Cashflow
(Net income + depreciation)/Total sales in the current quarter
Board
Number of total directors on the boards in the current quarter
Indep
Number of independent directors/Total number of directors on board in the current
quarter
LnGDP
Natural log of GDP per capita in each province
Z_score
The Z-score developed by Altman (1968). In particular, Z-score = 0.012X1 +
0.014X2 + 0.033X3 + 0.006X4 + 0.999X5, where X1 = working capital/Total assets,
X2 = retained earnings/Total assets, X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes/Total
assets, X4 = Market value of equity/Book value of total debt, and X 5 = Sales/Total
assets. The value of this variable is measured in the third quarter of 2008.
Wedge
Difference between the control rights and cash flow rights of the controlling
shareholders. The value of this variable is measured in the third quarter of 2008.
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